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Ek'1/tt7ct&ytf:~- fJ;Jtcl"'~ a-a:zCtez~& .~
l&rtroduction to Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
on "Atomic Bombs to U-Bombs in Ten Years"

Mr. President: Few subjects are of greater importance to the nation
and, for that matter, to the world, than the rapid development of the destructive
power of atomic weapons. A great deal of information on this subject has been
published in the press both in this country and abroad.

Yet we do not have this

information collected in a form that brings home to those of us who are not
apecialists the full impact of developments in this field.
We need not approach the subject of atomic weapons with fear.

On

the other hand, we cannot pass it off as just another innovation in military
science.

Either of these approaches, it seems to me, can lead us into very

serious errors of foreign policy.
What we require are the facts on the potentialities of atomic weapons
development.

We require them, moreover, in a perspective which will enable

us to understand the life and death issues that are involved.

Then, perhaps, we

may have a chance of devising effective policies for dealing with the enormous
forces which scientific knowledge is setting loose in the world.
As a step in my own education on this subject I have compiled a study of
developments in atomic weapons, as reported in the public press and it is the
information so obtained that I wish to make available to the Senate.
I reiterate that the material for this study has been drawn solely from
public sources. Enough has been published, however, to make clear that there is
an urgent need for a most penetrating study by the Senate as well as the Executive
Branch of the implications of atomic weapons developments for our foreign policy .
The time of decision on the question of the survival of civilization, if not human
Ufe itself, appears to be drawing uncomfortably close.

Sen tor Mike Man1field (D., Montana)

ATOMIC BOMBS TO U-BOMBS IN

It is almo1t ten years since

T~

YEARS

~
atomic-fi&sion bomb killed

the~

70, 000 people and destroyed two square miles of the city of Hiro1hima in
Japan. Since that fateful day the scientists of the free world and tho se
communiat world have made

o(

the

~dvances in the physical ecienccu.

Advance• in thi1 Atomic Aie have been ao ireat that it is predicted that it
is now possible to build~ bomb equivalent to 60 million tons of TNT.

Thh

prediction was made by Val Peterson, Civil Defense Administrator, in a
speech in Chicago on January 25, 1955,
Nine years after the bombing of Hiroshima, on March l, 1954, the
Atomic Energy Commission task group detonated a thermonuclear device of
monstroua size. In its widest implications that explosion has not yet ceased
to reverberate.

A long chain of incidents, ranging from the curious to the

tragic, has made it clear that "peacetime" nuclear explosions may be a
poasible threat to our well-being,

Storm signals !rom earlier atomic tests

such as fogged photographic fields and radioactive rain have

g~ven

way to the

storm -- which has already resulted in the radioactive poisoning of several
hundred people, according to news releases.
also blasted the lid of secrecy from the AEC's

The March 1, 1954 explosion

thermonuclea~

giving the public its first real look behind the "uranium curtain"; thus it is
now known that the AEC touched off three prior explosions, the third of which
was detonated in November, 1952,

Likewise, we have been told that the

Russian• have set off three more atomic explosions since August of last year.

___,
- 2 The March 1, 1954 bomb was expected to explode with a force of
!our to six megatons or, from 4 to 6 million tons of TNT; Instead, according
to Joseph and Stewart Alsop, New York Herald Tribune, April 7, 1954, the
force of the explosion was 14 megatons. It left scientific measuring instruments unable to record its full effects.

The magnitude of this test can best

be illustrated by comparison with previous explosions.

The earlier hydrogen

blast set off at Eniwetok equalled at least one megaton, or one million tons of
TNT.

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima equalled about 20, 000 tons of

TNT.

The largest blockbuster of World War II equalled ten tons of TNT.

Today, according to Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, March 17, 1955,
"our least powerful atomic weapon has an explosive force equivalent to about
3, 000 tons of TNT."

Sound waves from the March 1, 1954 blast were detected in

London, and an American astronomer said the flash could have been seen from
Mars. President Eisenhower admitted that the explosion astonished and surprised
the scientists, but the AEC called it a "routine atomic test," and clamped on the
tight lid of secrecy.

Then word leaked out that there were some inhabitants of

the Pacific islands who were "unexpectly" exposed to r<j.diation.
On March 13, 1954 a grave new consequence of the
test" was reported.

~'routine

atomic

The Japanese fishing trawler Fukuryu Maru docked in

Yaezu, Japan, with its twenty-three crew members showing symptoms of
acute radiation exposure.

They told how on March 1, 1954 they were some

eighty to ninety miles from Bikini, when at 4 a.m. they fancied they saw the
sun rising prematurely " in a strange manner." Six or seven minutes later
they heard a roar, and two hours later they were showered with a white aah,
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which continued to fall for aeveral hours.

The ash v.as fa l-out from tho

exploaion, consiatinc mainly of irradiated coral dust,

Only after they b d

become quite ill did they suspect that they had been rained with "ashes of
death" and headed for port.

'I'hey had on board 40 tons of freshly cau ht tuna

and ahark, which according to the

cw Yo rk Times exhibited radioactivity

"sufficient to be fatal to any person who re m ained for eight hours within
thirty yards of the fish."

Two of them were in worse condition than the reat,

having eaten some of the fish.

The crewmen were hospitalized, the trawler

was ordered burned at sea and sunk, and the fish buried but not before &everal
thousand pounds of the contaminated fish had been unloaded and shipped to
market,

A "hot fish" panic ensued in Japan, and police, in a frantic effort

to track it all down, ordered a thousand tons of other fish destroyed.
Soon after the mishap, Dr. John Morton, head of the Atomic Bomb
Casualty Commission (ABCC) at Hiroshima, reported concerning the twentythree fishermen, "they will recover completely within a month," But by the
23rd of March, 1954 five of the fishermen were reported in serious condition.
About March 25, 1954 it was reported that the U. S. Navy tanker
Patapsco, operating with the H-bomb task force group, had received "light
but not dangerous contamination by radioactive fall-out."
On March 27, 1954 two more "atom-dusted" Japanese trawler a
came into port and were quarantined,

One had been operating about 780

miles from the test site and the other 200 miles away.

There were numerous

other ramificationa, of varying degrees of gravity, from the first March
exploaion.

--._..!

- 4 On March 29, 1954, Newsweek magazine wrote:
"The subject isn 1 t discussed openly around the AEC but
scientists are worried about the whereabouts of the radioactive 1 mushroom cloud' generated by the March let Hbomb explosion, • • Within a few days after all previous
tests, laboratories around the U.S, have reported detecting traces of radiation in the atmosphere. So far no
traces have been spotted from the March 1 bomb, which
shot its mushroom an un·p recedented 20 miles into the air."
Against this turbulent background, the AEC detonated an even larger
H-bomb on March Z6, 1954. The March Z6th bomb was intended to have been
dropped by parachute from a B-36 superbomber, according to reports, but
for reasons of caution this plan was abandoned,
best since the bomb, expected to

develop~

This was probably for the
megatons, exploded instead

with about seventeen (according to the Alsops). And Newsweek later reported
on April lZ, 1954 that "Air Force officials refuse to talk about it, but a giant
B-36 superbomber observing the March 26th H-bomb explosion was flipped
completely over by the blast." The AEC had by now taken many new precautiona, such as extending the "restricted zone" to an area 450 miles wide,
covering several hundred thousand square miles.

It had searched the area

carefully, to make sure no ships were there, Nevertheless two Japanese
fishing boats came into port on April 8, 1954 with cargoes of radioactive tuna.
The guarded secrets and facts about the H-bomb were gradually
coming out and, as we know, a vast clamor rose about the tests around the
world. It seems that the test model we now have is a far cry from the H-bomb
ordered by President Truman in 1950, Thus, we now have a sketchy resume'
of the highlights following the March hydrogen bomb tests,
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Strange incidents continued to show

pin the newapapera but each

received less notice than the last, until it was practically forgotten.

Then

on September 23, 1954 Aikichi Kuboyarr.a, a bumble Japanese fisherman,
died -- the world's first fatality from a hydrogen bomb blast.

He died in

Tokyo Hospital, reportedly of jaundice brought on by radiation sickness.
This one death •••12:~~-;q:;~~p~~a::::&l~:;;gz:::;:*'G~tm~~bri n g a very
clo1e to home the horrifying aspects of the hydrogen bomb.
I admit to being a complete amateur in the physical sciences.

My

entire source of information has been a large number of our national

magazines, quarterlies, reviews and daily newspapers.

The material on the

atomic and hydrogen bombs, guided missiles, the cobalt bomb, radioiilctivity,
and the various aspects of nuclear warfare that I have accumulated has been
authored by eminent scientists and laymen.

The end result has been enlightening

but dieturbing.
It is difficult to realize that science has progressed to such a point
that one hydrogen bomb can destroy 200 square miles of a city and kill several
million city-dwellers.

New York, London, Moscow or Peking could be

effectively destroyed by a single H-bomb.
As I understand it, each exploded nuclear weapon sends into the
atmosphere its share of radioactive by-products.

One result of this is an

increase in the radioactivity of the gases which make up the earth's atmosphere.
The other is "fall-out".

The increase in radioactivity now appears incons e-

quential and will rem&.in eo unless there is a general war with the all-out uee

___,

--'
- 6 of nuclear weapons, in which case the matter could become serious, according
to the experts,

Unless such a war occurs, radioactivity will continue to be

less of a menace to humanity than automobile exhausts and cigarettes.
(The Commonweal, Dec. 10, 1954)
Fall-out, according to an article in The Commonweal, Dec. 10,
1954, is quite another matter.

When a nuclear explosion occurs, particles

of radioactive matter •• vaporized metal, sand, etc. -- are thrown into the
upper air and carried by the winds until they cool and resolidify.

Then they

drop like rain. It was such an unexpected fall-out which struck the Fukuryu
Maru.
Atomic weapons, particularly those in high-penetration missiles
and "small" bombs, do not produce fall-out of any drastic consequence. But
the Commonweal article says that a strategy of attacks on industrial complexes
would almost inevitably mean the large-scale employment of air burst hydrogen
bombs,

Judging from published reports, an aU-out air-burst hydrogen attack

on a scale intended to cripple a modern state could render uninhabitable an
area equivalent to the populated portions of Russia or North America, Unexpected winds, like those which affected the Japanese fishermen, could bring
the fall-out down upon the attacking -- or an innocent -- nation,

The combina-

tion of these two dangers, general radioactivity and fall-out, not to mention
the incredible physical destruction involved, would mean that a nation
launching aU-out nuclear war would be toying with human suicide.
Overshadowed by the official announcements and speculation about
the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb is the so-called "C-bomb" or cobalt
b.lmb.

- 7 According to a New York Times article, March 28, 1954, "This in
itself will not be an explosive weapon desi(;ned primarily for ma.ss destruction
by blast and heat, but a vehicle of radiological warfare.
to powerful explosive weapons.

It would be an additive

The explosion would disseminate the radio-

activity impregnated in the element cobalt--."
In an all-out war situation, there might be a need for other means
of incapacitating enemy troops or war workers or of rendering a big area
uninhabitable for a period.

In such a case the natural "fall-out" of radiated

material from an atomic cloud, with its short life, would be inadequate.

The

problem seems to be to keep alive, at a high level, the radioactive contamination.

The mineral element cobalt is providing tho answer.
Cobalt, according to the New York Times, it not fissionable.

That

is, its atoms cannot be split readily like uranium, nor fusioned, driven
together, like hydrogen.

But some forms, such as the element Cobalt 60,

have a prolonged radioactive life when impregnated,
last for several years.

The contamination can

Of equal significance militarily, other atomic forms

of the element have much shorter life spans, so the contamination can be
impoaed for days or even years.
Professor Otto R. Frisch, the noted British professor of nuclear
physics at Cambridge University issued a warning in a speech in January,
1954, that he believed that a "cobalt bomb" could wipe out all civilization.
Frisch helped build the first American atom bomb.
According to a February 13, 1955 news release from Hamburg,
Germany, Nobel Prize winner Otto Hahn, first man to split uranium, declared

- 8 that the explosion

of~ cobalt-coated

hydrogen bombs could endanger continu•

ation of human life, "no matter where they are dropped."

The scientist said

radioactive explosion dust, coated with cobalt 60, would retain its fatal effects
for years "and destroy all life," He said the danger for mankind is even bigger
since the price of radioactive cobalt is only a small fraction of that of the same
amount of radium.
As a finale to the intrigue and speculation over the atomic and hydroget
tests, the Washington Post & Times Herald reported on March 5, 1955 that,
"The 'thermonuclear device' detonated on March 1, 1954 in the Pacific was
more than a single hydrogen bomb -- it was an incredibly enriched superbomb
offering the most potent weapon of death

;:~.nd

destruction thus far known."

"It was not the long-dreaded cobalt bomb, either, but its fire-ball
blast and lethal radioactive fall-out quickly outdated even the concept of the
C-bomb,"
The International News Service has learned authoritatively the
March first blast used a hydrogen bomb core surrounded by a deadly jacket of
natural state uranium (U-238), a relatively inexpensive substance,

The result

of this new super-bomb, the U·bomb, surpasses the death potential of the
theoretical C-bomb.

This conclusion has been verified by top nuclear scientists.

The February 15, 1955 AEC report revealed that the death-zone from
radioactive fall-out in the March first blast covered a cigar-shaped area up to
7, 000 square miles.
According to the press the same principle works in both the U and Cbombs, A cobalt jacket would surround the bomb core and -- when exploded ••
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lay down a lethal radioactive blanket of dust over large area a.

The di!!crence,

aa already noted, is that cobalt decays very slowly while uranium decays r pidly.
Since the rate of decay is related to f1e radioactivity given o!!, thia mcana that
cobalt has a relatively low lethal value per day.

On the other hand, uranium

gives off a high dosage in the first few hours.
So, while cobalt can contaminate an area for a long period of time,
its low radioactivity gives populations a chance to evacuate.

With uranium,

enough radioactivity ia laid down to give an immediate lethal dose.

One o! tho

advantages, if that can be said, is that the new U -bomb is cheap and very
effective.

There is no need to refino uranium into the precocious U-235.

Scientists have been unable to experiment with the Cobalt bomb because it
would leave a large area contaminated for a long period of time, years perhaps.
The United States is far advanced in many respects as compared to
tho Soviet Union.

While their military strength is considerable and increasing,

we outstrip them in most fields except mass manpower.
Published estimates of comparative nuclear strength in the New York
Times, March 4, 1955, indicates that the United States stockpile of all types of
nuclear weapons is probably more than 5, 000.

The Russian stockpile may be

more than 500, perhaps as many as 1, 000. 1£ a more accurate yardstick is
used -- the total yield of the two stockpiles -- the combined power of available
Russian weapons today is between twenty and forty megatons, or the equivalent
of 20 million to 40 million tons of TNT,

One United States thermonuclear test

device, detonated a year ago in the Pacific released the equivalent of ZO million
tons of TNT.

__,

--

I

- 10 Moreover, according to the New York Times, there is no clear-cut
evidence that Russia yet has an operational hydrogen bomb, one that can be
carried by plane.

There is no physical evidence that the Russians have prac-

ticed air refueling. Another illustration, the bulk of their long-range bomber
fleet is still composed of more than 1, 000 B-29 type propeller-drive aircraft,
which are obsolete in our services except for special missions.
My immediate concern is not that the Russians are going to take the
lead in this race very soon or that the United States will ever take a secondary
role.
The danger which has disturbed me above all the mysteries of the
Atomic Age, is whether or not there is a

world-wide cut-of!, ~r danger

·' ·· ··

Will the abnormal amount
of radioactivity released in each explosion have a very slow but definite cumulative effect upon the earth's atmosphere and or upon its vegetable and animal
life, and hence upon human life?
There are many scientists and lay people who are worried about this
possibility and they do not know the comp1ete answer.

According to a

November 8, 1954 article in the New York Times. "The increasing worry -- and
it is nothing more definite than that -- is primarily about the ingestion and
inhalation and absorption of tiny radioactive particles -- not at the moment about
the external menace of these particles to the human body."
According to the press, there seems to be a real possibility that
continued exploaiona could slowly raise radioactive levels around the world to
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the detriment of health and human genetics, and there is the sure kr.owledge
that the area o£ immediately dangerous "fall-out" is rr.uch larger than had been
expected before the last tests in the Paciiic,
one extreme to the other.

Views on this topic extend from

Nevertheless there is genuine concern about

this problem, and I am in complete sympathy with that concern.

In November of 1954 Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated in the
House of Commons that it was his "understanding" that the radioactivity released
by the explosions of nuclear devices might be "cumulative" and that the detonation
of an "undue number" might have serious effect upon the earth's atmosphere for
5, 000 years.

This 1tatement may have created unnecessary fear, but at the 1ame

time no one has the answer.,
During the CBS "Years of Crisis" broadcast on January Z, 1955 correapondent David Schoenbrun, spoke of the great scare that was raised in France
last December when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Prince Louis de Broglie
claimed that the danger-point in atomic saturation of the earth's atmosphere has
already been reached, perhaps it has even been surpassed, by the result of ten
H-bombs being exploded experimentally in the last two years.

He warned that

life on earth might be changed or even wiped out if ten or fifteen more bomba are
exploded in the next yau or two, even without war.

~~

Is there att=intel:nal threat? As nuclear tests go on, will the earth1 s
atmosphere become contaminated? Will animals and humans occasionally
subjected to small but more than normal amounts of radioactivity, absorb,
breathe or eat these particles to such an extent that development, growth,
or lit'e itself might be affected?
In a series of articles in the Washington Evening: Star by Science
Editor, Thomas R. Henry, he writes of the threat to the continued existence
of man on earth during this Atomic Age.

What is involved in this threat is not the frequently voiced fear
of slaughter and destruction in war on an unprecedented scale, but of the

effects of a hidden, insidious, largely undetectable and uncontrollable poison
which perhaps is capable of destroying the human race as a biological genus.
According to this thesis, which admittedly is far from sa tis·
factorily established, it is not members of the present generation who
are being injured. It is their unborn descendants for generations to come.
These implications were stated forcefully by Professor A. H.
Sturtevant in an address before the Pacific Division of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science. "There is no possible escape from the conelusion that the bombs already exploded will ultimately result in the production

.
'

- 13 of numerous defective individuals -generations.

i{

the human race survives !or many

The risk is one to which the ontira human race, preaent and

future, il being subjected," the California professor said.
Scientist• are very concerned over the possible effect of radiatio n
on the genetic structure of man.

The series of articles by Thomas Henry is

only one o! many attempts to bring the problem to the general public in words
they can understand,
In the face of warnings from some of the world's foremost geneticists

that the human race may suffer serious deterioration over a course of generations
because of the inevitable buildup in the background radiation of the earth due to
atomic; bomb detonations, experiments to date indicate the danger may be quito
e.xaggeratea.
This is reassuring but at the same time there is no positive proof
that future generations will not be affected.
On February 15, 1955 Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energ)
Commission, announced officially that a hydrogen bomb such as was exploded in
the Bikini Atoll last March is capable of blanketing a 7 ,000-square-mile area
the size of New Jeraey with deadly radioactive fall-out.
According to the Vlashington Post, "Such a bomb, if exploded over
Norfolk, for example, could shower enough fall-out particles to:
"Kill all the unprotected persons living as far north as the
aouthweat edge of Washington,
"Kill haU the unprotected persona living between Washington
and the outskirts of Baltimore,
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"Kill five or ten percent of the unprotected living between
Baltimore and the Maryland-Pennsylvania line.
"Allow the residents of Harrisburg, Fa. -- more than ZZO
miles away from Norfolk -- the dubious privilege of being
left alive to gaze at the holocaust within the deadly fall-out
ellipse.
"The projections, drawn from figures in the report, are
extremes," based on the assumption that the inhabitants
remained fully exposed to the radioactivity over a 36hour period, taking no shelter or other protective
measures. Even simple shelters, Strauss said, greatly
reduce the danger from radioactivity.
This belated admission of this new atomic hazard has come long after
unofficial analyses had described the newest danger. It is assumed by some that
this report was planned to coincide with the start of the new series of atomic
tests in Nevada and may have been intended to assure the American people that
the Nevada tests represented only a very slight danger. As I understand it,
atomic weapons, particularly those in high penetration missiles and "small"
bombs, do not produce fall-out of any drastic consequence,

Presumably these

are the type atomic weapons which are being tested in Nevada.

The second test

of the 1955 series in Nevada, a small nuclear device -- the probable prototype -exploded on February ZZnd with a force that jarred cities 135 miles away.

The

pre-dawn flash was seen 400 miles away, according to the February Zlrd
edition of the Washington Post & Times Herald.
The device tested on the Yucca Flats is said to have been one

o~

the

smaller weapons. The shot rattled windows in La$ Vegas, 75 miles away, and
jolted St. George, Utah, 135 miles eastward. It gave the Congressmen, AEC
scientists and ZOO military observers a sharp jolt or two, depending on where

- 15 they were atanding.

Wind and atmospharic conditions were auch that th

rumble of the blast was heard in Biahop, Califorr,ia, about 140 airl ne miles
weat, but akip;>ed the Charleston range where many ob&ervera were watchin&
the testa.
The orange flash was reported to have lit up the morning aky in
Loa Angelea, about 250 miles away, and was visible in Sacramento, California
and the San Francisco Bay area, 400 miles distant.

The biggest blast of the new atomic test series on March 7, thia year
flashed forks of light visible in a dozen states including Montana, caused an
earth rumble 360 miles away, and sent scientists and soldiers scurrying for
aafety !rom the Nevada test site.

The predawn flash of a nuclear device

believed to be at least 1-1/2 times the strength of the standard A-bomb wu
seen in the Black Hills o£ South Dakota, more than 800 miles northeast, aouth
o£ the border in Mexico and in all eleven western states,

The fireball lasted

20 aeconds, according to the Washington Post and Times Herald.
Incidentally, in statements to the press, two Colorado University
profeuors said that fall-out from the Nevada tests can no longer be ignored
by persons concerned with public health and safety.

Dr. Ray R. Lanier and

Dr. Theodore Puck were not suggesting that necessary nuclear teata be
discontinued but streased the importance of continued study of the effecta o£
theae experiment• on the human race.

- 16 I recognize the necessity and value of tests and experiments, but
at the same time it is difficult to reconcile this with the possibility of miscalculation and

~he

number of hydrogen and atomic bomb explosions that it

will take to make the atmosphere radioactive, if there is any basis to the
nu~erous

fears of some of the world's greatest scientists. In addition to the

remarks of scientists and statesmen that I have already cited, a statement
made by Dr • . Edgar D. Adrian has been brought to my attention.

He is

quoted as saying last fall, "We must face the possibility that repeated atomic
explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity, which no one can
tolerate or escape." Adrian, President of the Royal Society, is a former
Nobel Prize winner and serves officially as the master of Trinity College,
Cambridge University in England.
President Eisenhower and Chhlrman Strauss have answered the
question; should we continue to test hydrogen weapons? Their answer was
yes.

There is a great element of risk in this decision, but at the same time

it is the only answer at the moment, for it might very well be disastrous i£
the Soviet Union was allowed to gain an advantage over us.
There are those who feet that continued atomic and hydrogen bomb
tests are a crime against humanity and will only intensify the jeopardy to the
human race. Others feel the program. should be expanded and accelerated
in this race with the Soviet Union. Few will argue against forging ahead in
the nuclear sciences, but relying on the hydrogen bomb as our principal offensive weapon is something else again. It is definitely a deterrent but complete
reliance Qn such a suicidal weapon

m~y

lead to self-destruction.

',I
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The latest move along this dangerous path is the new doctrine o!
"lir.1ited" atomic war with tactical weapons, recently expounded by Seer t ry
of State Dulles, with the endorsement of President Eiscnbowt!r.

Thu new

doctrine haa merit in timo of war when considering our present nuclear power
superiority when faced with the Communist advantage in ground forces.

But

this argument seems to be rather shortsighted.
Tactical atomic weapons used on military targets only is a wishful
attempt at minimizing the dangers of nuclear warfare.

Can we rely entirely

on this increased precision and accuracy? We must not overlook the
unpredictable changes in weather, human error and mechanical failures.
Military targets, particularly airfields, are usually near towns and cities,
A weapon large enough to insure the destruction of such targets will almost
inevitably take a toll of non-military areas.

To completely paralyze an

enemy it would be necessary to hit the cities, the centers of industry.
-

The nuclear bombardment of

/,I-

·/1/

~it:!.{-?v-t:f('

citie~Wo.GW-turn

war into suicide.

I find

very little assurance in the possibility of limiting an atomic war once it
was started.
It is not my intention at this time to discuss the merits and

demerits of the present military and defense program in general.

An

excerpt from an address by Sir Winston Churchill in the House of Common&
on March 1, 1955 at this point might be very timely.

He said:

- 18 -

"The hydrogen bomb has made an astounding incursion into the structure of our lives and thoughts. Its
impact is prodigious and profound, but I do not agree
with those who say, 1 Let us sweep away forthwf.fu all
our existing defense services and concentrate cur
energy and resources on nuclear weapons and their
immediate ancillaries. 1 The policy of the deterrent
cannot rest on nuclear weapons alone. We must,
together with our NATO allies, maintain the defen•
sive shield in Western Europe."

We do not have the answers to substantiate or discredit the fears
about continued hydrogen tests, or if answers do exist, they are kept under
a tight lid of secrecy.

Until such time as we know of these things, we should

not for one moment forget the earth shattering and destructive power tha.t we
are placing so much confidence in.
The working paper Qefore the United Nations sponsored by
the United States proposes the establishment of a United Nations disarma•
ment and atomic energy development authority composed of the members
of the Security Council and Canada.

The objectives in establishing this

authority were:
1. To provide international control of atomic energy so as to
enforce cornpliance with the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and
ins~re

that nuclear materials are used for peaceful purposes.

- 19 -

z.

To auperviae programs for limitation and balanced reductlon of

armed force& a.nd conventional armaments, and prohibition and elimination of
major mae 1 destruction weapons,
3.

To supervise the various safeguard• necessary to enforce a

dharrnament program, including disclosure and vcrifico.tion,
4,

To asaure each participant that the other states are observini

the various agreements.
It i l the opinion of many that such a disarmament program &a thia

ia somewhat of a lost cause in many respects.

The Soviet Union has placed

many obataclea in the course of any plan which would meet the approval of
the Western World,

The most recent was the new Soviet demand, made public

almost on the eve of the latest London negotiations, !or a preliminary "freeze"
on armed forces and armaments as of last Jan. 1.

Such a "freeze" would

prevent the armament of Japan and, more particularly, West Germany •
.-

\This i8 unacceptable to both the United States and Great Britain.

At

this point it h very unlikely that any system of inspection can be arranged to
meet the approval of all nations concerned,
In recent months a great deal of interest has been rallied around a
proposal to seek an international moratorium on experimental detonations of
hydrogen bombs.

Such a moratorium was suggested last fall by David R, Inglis, of
the Argonne National Laboratory, and proposed informally to the President
and the Secretary of State by Pierre Mendes -France during his Premierahlp.

.,
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- zo It also has the backing of the Asian Prime Ministers who met at the Colombo

' Plan conference in Jakarta last December, though they suggested it n*cauae
they thought it would be a substitute for disarmament but because so many o£
them do not like the nearness of the Pacific proving grounds.
The Washington Post and Times Herald, on February 11, 1955 sug·
gested in its editorial columns five significant advantages of such a proposal.
They are briefly: (a) The plan would be a step, even though a small step, away
from war: (b) the ban would be self-enforcing, no elaborate enforcing machinery:
(c) it would tend to curb the development of new nuclear devices; (d) the ban
would relieve fears about the further accumulation of radioactivity in the atmosphere; (e) a careful proposal would help convince the world of the sincerity of
this country's efforts to reverse the drift toward war.
Before I conclude I wish to make note of a proposal sponsored by the
Federation of American Scientists which would establish a United Nations commission to study the effects of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.

The 2000-

member federation suggests that the UN commission examine the extent of
radioactive contamination as the result of past tests, evaluate the potential
genetic effects on human beings of future tests and attempt to establish a
"danger threshold," This proposal is more or less a modification of the plan
I have just discussed.

If the United States were to initiate a program along these lines,
it would undoubtedly have a great effect in quieting many fears.

